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Anchored Narratives in Reasoning about 
Evidence 
Floris Bex1, Henry Prakken1,2 and Bart Verheij3 
1Centre for Law & ICT, University of Groningen, the Netherlands 
2Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, the 
Netherlands 
3Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, the Netherlands 
Abstract. This paper concerns the reasoning with stories, evidence and generali-
sations in a legal context. We will make some notions from the existing Anchored 
Narratives theory more clear by making use of two formal techniques from AI, 
namely causal-abductive reasoning and default-style argumentation. We will 
propose a combination of these two formalisms which solves some of the 
problems of the causal-abductive approach. 
1. Introduction 
In matters of evidence, a judge, a juror and an investigating officer all have to reason 
from the evidence in a case to a conclusion and, particularly in the investigative phase, 
also vice versa. Often, the reasoner must not only apply the rules of law to the case 
facts, but he must also use commonsense knowledge about the world. In the case of a 
criminal investigation, the fact finder must check whether the case facts comply with 
the hypothesis he has in mind. In a complex case with much evidence, often different 
viewpoints must be considered and it is not always clear whether or not the accused is 
guilty (in a criminal case) or what direction a criminal investigation should take.  
John Henry Wigmore was one of the first scholars who analysed reasoning with 
evidence and proof in a legal context [15]. Among other things, he developed a 
graphical notation for evidential arguments and their sources of doubt.. Based on 
Wigmore’s work, Anderson, Twining, Tillers and Schum [1][10] have more recently 
discussed such topic as the logic of inferences about facts, the use of formal 
probabilistic methods in evaluating evidence and the visualisation of evidential 
arguments. In AI & Law, Bex et al. [4] formalised Wigmore’s notation in a formal 
argumentation framework, using an approach with argumentation schemes. Finally, 
Walton [14] looked at reasoning with evidence from the standpoint of informal logic.  
As an alternative to these argument-based approaches, psychologists have 
proposed a more holistic approach to legal reasoning with evidence, based on the 
notion of narrative, or story. For example, Bennet and Feldman [2] and Pennington and 
Hastie [8], argue that reasoning about evidence is most persuasive if it takes the form 
of constructing stories about what happened. Crombag et al. [5] have further developed 
this approach. According to their Anchored Narratives Theory (ANT)., the only viable 
way in which factual judicial decision making can proceed is by constructing stories 
and supporting, or “anchoring” them by common sense generalisations. This approach 
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has gained interest  of others as well. For example, Anderson, Twining and Schum 
devote a chapter to stories in their last edition of Analysis of Evidence ([1], pp. 280), 
and Verheij [12] compares the anchored narratives approach with an argument based 
approach in. Thagard [9] has applied his connectionist model of abductive inference to 
the best explanation to legal cases, claiming that it provides a computational account of 
the story approach to legal evidence. Likewise, Keppens and Schafer [6] have applied 
model-based reasoning to automated support for the investigation of murder cases.   
Despite this recent interest in the role of stories in evidential reasoning, an analytic 
account of the elements of a story and how it relates to generalisations and evidence is 
still lacking. Our aim in this paper is to clarify ANT in these two respects, making use 
of formal techniques from AI (& Law). We will propose to model stories as a causal-
abductive theory and we will argue that these theories should be connected to the 
available evidence with argumentation. This gives rise to a distinction between two 
kinds of story anchoring, viz. internal and external anchoring. We will then illustrate 
our proposal in detail with an example also used by Crombag et al.  
 
2. Anchored Narratives 
In [5] and [13], Crombag, Van Koppen and Wagenaar both study empirically how 
judge in Dutch criminal cases decide on the facts and propose their ANT as a 
normative model. According to ANT, legal decisions have to be based on stories, 
which have to be anchored in common sense generalisations. In ANT, judges first 
determine the quality of the stories of the parties presented to them by the prosecution 
and the defence and then examine the anchoring of the stories using common sense 
generalisations, some of which can be considered as strictly true, for example ’a person 
cannot be in two places at the same moment’, while other ones can be doubted, for 
example ’Witnesses under oath usually speak the truth’. The questions are whether the 
implicit generalisations that the story itself invokes are safe to believe and whether the 
generalisations which allow us to reason from the evidence to the story are safe to 
believe. We now examine these two issues in more detail.  
2.1. The quality of the story 
When determining the quality of a story, Crombag et al. draw on work by Bennet and 
Feldman [2] and Pennington and Hastie [8]. The core of a good story about a criminal 
case is an action, namely the criminal offence, and its consequences. A good story tells 
how the circumstances brought the actor in such a psychological and/or physical state 
that he had a motive and an opportunity to commit the criminal offence.  
Pennington and Hastie [8] proposed the causal story structure in Figure 1 ,   as a 
template for stories about intentional actions and their consequences. Crombag et al. 
adopted this structure since it captures the elements that have to be proven in a standard 
crime: who is the offender (the actor in the story), what did he do (the actions) and did 
he act intentionally or recklessly (the psychological states/goals). In ANT, a story’s 




Figure 1: Pennington and Hastie's story structure 
 
This criterion is also discussed by Pennington and Hastie. However, they also 
discuss two other criteria not discussed in ANT, namely coverage and consistency. A 
story’s coverage is the extent to which the story accounts for the evidence presented, 
while a story is consistent to the extent that it does not contradict itself or any of the 
evidence. Pennington and Hastie also give a fourth principle, namely plausibility, 
which says that a story is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to the decision 
maker’s knowledge of the world. This last principle corresponds to what Crombag et 
al. mean by the anchoring of the story so we will discuss it in section 2.2. 
2.2. Anchoring the story 
In addition to being good, stories must also be anchored in common sense 
knowledge of the world around us. How this anchoring works is best explained through 
an example, namely the King case ([5], pp. 460-463), a relatively simple case about an 
alleged burglary. The prosecution presents the following story:  
 
On the 18th of November, Andrew King climbs over the fence of the 
backyard of the Zomerdijk family with the intention to look if there is 
something interesting for him in the family’s house. Through this yard he 
walks to the door that offers entry into the bedroom of the 5-year-old 
son of the family. The door is not closed, so King opens it and enters 
the bedroom to see if there is anything of interest in the house. Because 
it is dark, King does not see the toy lying on the floor. King hits the 
toy, causing it to make a sound which causes the dog to give tongue. King 
hears the dog and runs outside, closing the door behind him. Mr. 
Zomerdijk hears the toy and the dog. He goes to the bedroom and sees King 
running away through the closed garden door. He shouts “there is a 
burglar, come and help me!” and runs into the garden after King. King, 
who wants to pretend he is lost, does not run away. In spite of this, 
Zomerdijk jumps on King and, aided by his brother, who is visiting the 
Zomerdijk family, molests King.  
 
This is a fairly plausible story because it appeals to certain implicit generalisations 
that seem obvious when made explicit; for example, King must have been the person 
who hit the toy if the rest of the family and the visitors were in the living room, and he 
was probably up to no good anyway. Why else did he enter the garden in the first place, 
and why did he run away when Mr. Zomerdijk appeared in the bedroom?  
In order to evaluate the story, two types of generalisations are relevant. Firstly, the 
causal links within the story must be justified by plausible causal generalisations, such 
as “If a sound is heard in the bedroom and all the people you know are in the living 
room, there must be someone else in the bedroom” and “if someone runs away through 
the garden he was probably up to no good”. Secondly, the story must be linked to the 
available evidence by plausible evidential generalisations, such as “witnesses usually 
speak the truth”. In the King case, the prosecution’s story is mainly based on the 
testimonies given by Mr. and Mrs. Zomerdijk and their visitors. If the decision-maker 
believes the prosecutor’s story, he accepts the generalisation that “witnesses usually 
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speak the truth”. Alternatively, the decision maker can think that the witnesses want to 
protect each other. This is an exception to the generalisations that witnesses usually 
speak the truth, and if the decision maker has a good reason to believe that the 
witnesses want to protect each other, he will no longer believe that they speak the truth. 
In ANT it is discussed in detail how generalisations can be analysed in this way 
and decision makers are urged to make the common sense knowledge they use to come 
to their decision explicit, so that the ultimate decision is better motivated and not based 
on dubious generalisations. However, the details of what part the generalisations play 
in a story are left untreated. Also, the exact interplay between the evidence, a story and 
the generalisations connecting these two is not elaborated upon.  
3. Logical tools for analysing the Anchored Narratives theory 
From the discussion so far it has turned out that, while the ANT seems basically sound, 
no analytical account of how the interplay between stories, generalisations and 
evidence takes place has yet been provided. Our first aim therefore is to determine the 
exact role generalisations play in reasoning with stories and evidence. Our second aim 
is to give evidence a more prominent place in the evaluation of stories by using the 
notions of coverage and consistency.  
In our analysis we will use some existing logical tools, and propose some 
adjustments to these tools. In section 3.1 we will model stories as a causal network that 
can be used in abductive inference to the best explanation. Section 3.2 introduces 
notions from argumentation logics, which are used to connect stories to the pieces of 
evidence in the case. Because of space limitations our notation will be largely 
semiformal but they easily map onto well-known formalisms. 
3.1. Stories as a causal networks 
Before investigating how generalisations  can be analysed, we will first have to say 
something about the formal structure of stories and the role they play in the anchoring 
process. An underlying principle in all above-discussed approaches to stories is the 
causality between the states and events in a story. Our proposal is therefore to model 






































King has bad 
intentions
 
Figure 2: the King story as a causal network 
 
Note that by modelling stories in this way, some information is lost. For example, the 
different categories proposed in Pennington and Hastie’s template are no longer part of 
the theory. However, we will argue that this way of modelling has its advantages and 
leave other aspects of stories for future research. 
A causal network can be used as an abductive theory, in which observations are 
explained by hypothesised events or states through abductive reasoning, or ‘inference 
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to the best explanation’ (IBE). In AI many formal and computational accounts of IBE 
are available. However, the following simplified account covers their main elements 
and suffices for present purposes.  
A causal theory T is a set of implications of the form c1 & … & cn ⇒c e, where      
c1  …  cn are literals, standing for causes that in conjunction produce an effect e, which 
also is a literal. Causal rules can be chained, since effects can in turn be causes of other 
effects. In addition there is a consistent set O of observations (a set of literals), which 
are to be explained by T. More precisely, an observation o ∈ O is explained by T if for 
some set H ⊆ T of hypotheses it holds that  
• H ∪ T  ⊧ o; and  
• H ∪ T is consistent.  
 
In AI usually only subset-minimal sets of hypotheses are considered. Also, in AI it is 
usually required that a hypothesis explains all observations in O but this condition is 
unrealistic if the correctness and completeness of the causal theory is not guaranteed, 
(cf. [9]), as is often the case in legal evidential reasoning.  
The IBE approach nicely captures the explanatory role of evidential stories. 
However, it abstracts from their internal anchoring with causal generalisations; the 
theory T contains causal rules, but there is no possibility to reason about these rules. 
IBE also has a problem in dealing with witness testimonies as evidence. It requires that 
witness testimonies are regarded as caused by other things. For instance, the truth of 
what is testified is regarded as causing the testimony. Of course, since witnesses do not 
always speak the truth, other possible causes of a testimony must also be modelled, 
such as a motive to lie, or circumstances that can cause flawed perception or memory. 
So causal rules like the following ones should also be included:  
 
p ⇒c w said “p”  
w has reason to lie about p  ⇒c w said “p”  
w hallucinated and thought he saw p ⇒c w said “p” 
 
However, this creates the following problem. What we want to know is how the theory 
explains the observation that w said “p”. In a causal theory with the above three rules, 
the testimony can be explained in three ways: it can be explained in the ‘normal’ way 
by supposing that the witness speaks the truth, i.e. by p, but it can also be explained by 
supposing that w has reason to lie about p and by supposing that w hallucinated and 
thought he saw p.  Moreover, these explanations fair equally well on coverage and 
consistency so there is no obvious way to prefer the ‘normal’ explanation. In this way, 
the abductive approach fails to capture that witness testimonies are usually true; w has 
reason to lie about p and w hallucinated and thought he saw p should not be 
‘abducibles’: they are exceptions to a default rule and should therefore be assumed 
false if there is no evidence to the contrary.  
Our solution to this problem is to invert causal generalisations in which the 
antecedent is the usual cause of the consequent into evidential generalisations (this 
terminology is due to Pearl (1998) [7]). These evidential generalisations are then used 
to connect nodes in the story structure to evidence outside that structure; this 
connection is formalised as argumentation, in particular, default reasoning and 
reasoning with argumentation schemes.    
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3.2. Evidence and arguments 
We assume a logic in which applications of deductive and/or defeasible inferences can 
be chained into tree-structured arguments. Associated with a defeasible inference is a 
generalisation that acts as the warrant (cf. Toulmin [11]) for the inference.  Because we 
want to be able to change generalisations, they are modelled as additional premises to 
an argument and are subject to a defeasible modus ponens inference rule which allows 
for exceptions. We assume that the logic respects Pearl’s c-e rules [7], that is, it is not 
allowed to apply an evidential generalisation to a proposition that has been inferred by 
application of a causal rule.  
A defeasible argument can be attacked in two ways. It can be rebutted with an 
argument for the opposite conclusion, while it can be undercut with an argument why a 
generalisation does not apply in the given circumstances. Arguments can be either 
justified, which means that they are not attacked by other justified arguments that are 
stronger, or overruled, which means that they are attacked by one or more other 
stronger arguments that are justified, or defensible, which means that they are neither 
justified nor overruled.   
In this paper, causal networks, arguments and inferences are represented through 
figures (see Figure 3 for examples). This is a semi-formal way of representing them, 
but a formal translation into well-known formalisms is straightforward.  
 
 
Figure 3: stories, arguments and generalisations 
3.3. Combining causal and evidential reasoning 
We now discuss how  the abductive and argumentation formalisms can be combined. 
The idea is that by providing stories and explanations for certain facts, the parties build 
a causal network. By telling the main story, the prosecution provides us with the causal 
network as seen in Figure 2. If King gives an alternative explanation for the fact that he 
was in the yard, for example, because he was lost, he adds a node King is lost to the 
network, which is linked to King climbs in into backyard by a causal link. King can 
also tell a different story explaining, for example, why the toy made a sound. We will 
explore this in further detail in section 4. In addition to giving (alternative) 
explanations for facts, it is also possible to support or defeat facts in the story with 
evidence through evidential arguments. Important here is that only propositions 
supported by evidence have to be explained; only if a proposition in the causal network 
is supported by a justified argument, it becomes a member of the set O. It is also 
possible that a proposition in the causal network is defeated by an evidential argument; 
in this case, the proposition should ideally not be explained by H ∪ T.    
With such a causal network connected to evidence, generalisations can be critically 
examined in two different ways. The first is by refining it, which adds a new condition, 
which must also be proven (cf. [3]).   The second way is to provide evidence that there 
is an exception to the generalisation.. If the decision maker thinks that a certain 
generalisation is implausible, he can change it into a refined version. For example, the 
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generalisation “if a person has the opportunity to enter a house (where he does not 
live), then he will do so” can be refined into “if a person has the opportunity to enter a 
house (where he does not live) and he has bad intentions, then he will do so”. If the 
decision maker instead believes a generalisation but thinks that in the case at hand an 
exception to the default generalisation applies, then he can also attack the 
generalisation. For example, if one of the three witnesses (Mr. Zomerdijk, his wife and 
his brother) explicitly stated that they wanted to protect each other, then the inference 
the witnesses testify that they were in the living room ⇒e the three 
witnesses were in the living room, which is based on the generalisation 
“witnesses usually speak the truth”, is undercut by an exception..  
4. Anchoring the King story: a worked out example 
In this section we illustrate the combination of causal and evidential reasoning given in 
section 3 with an account of the King case. In addition to the story from section 2.2 
(see Figure 2), we also have a number of testimonies. King testified that he climbed 
over a wall to get into the backyard. Mr. Zomerdijk, witness 1 (w1) from here on, 
testified the following: “I was in the living room with my wife and my brother, and 
suddenly I heard a toy making a sound in the bedroom. I went to the bedroom and, 
through the closed door, I saw a man, who I now know to be Andrew King, running 
away from the house in the backyard. I went outside and ran after the man. My brother 
also came to help me and we grabbed the man”. Mr. Zomerdijk’s brother (w2), testified 
that he was in the living room and that suddenly, Mr. Zomerdijk stood up and went to 
the bedroom. When the brother went after him a few seconds later, he saw a man 
running in the garden and grabbed him. Mrs. Zomerdijk said she was in the living room 
with her husband and brother-in-law. This evidence can be used to support some of the 


















































King has bad 
intentions
 
Figure 4: the main King story and its supporting evidence 
 
According to section 3.3, the observations that have to be explained by the causal 
theory are the propositions in the story that follow from undefeated evidential 
arguments, in this case {King climbs into backyard, others in living room, w1 hears 
toy, w1 goes to bedroom, w1 sees King, w1- w2 grab King, door is closed}. If we take a 
hypothesis H1 = {King has bad intentions, others in living room}, then all the 
observations are explained by H1 ∪ T.  
We next consider the evidential links between the evidence and the network. If we 
accept the link between the three testimonies and others in the living room, we 
implicitly accept the generalisation “if three witnesses testify that “p”, then usually p is 
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true”. In section 3.3 we saw that one way to attack this generalisation is to say that “if 










If three witnesses 
say that “p” then p
if three witnesses try to 
protect each other, then 
they will not speak the truth
w1, w2 and w3 
try to protect 
each other 
 
Figure 5: a generalisation is attacked 
 
However, in this case the decision maker does not have a direct reason to believe that 
the witnesses tried to protect each other, so the generalisation is not defeated and the 
argument for other in living room is justified.  
The causal generalisations within the story can also be analysed. A dubious causal 
link in the story is the one between King climbs into backyard, others in living room 
and King opens door. This link stands for the (more abstract) generalisation “if a 
person has the opportunity to enter a house (where he does not live), he will do so”. 
This generalisation arguably is too general to be acceptable as an anchor; not 
everybody who has the opportunity enters another person’s house. One possible 
remedy is to refine the generalisation,  for example, into “if a person has the 
opportunity to enter a house (where he does not live) and he has bad intentions, he will 
do so”. The resulting generalisation is more acceptable as an anchor.. Figure 6 shows a 
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Figure 6: part of the King network with added links and generalisations  
 
King has his own explanation for the fact that the toy made a sound; he claims that the 
wind blew open the door, hit the toy (which caused it to make a sound) and then blew 
the door shut again. This explanation extends the causal network of Figure 4 with the 
following rules: 
 
wind opens door ⇒c wind hits toy; wind hits toy ⇒c toy makes sound;  
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wind opens door ⇒c wind closes door; wind closes door ⇒c door closed 
 
This extension of the theory adds a new explanation for the propositions toy makes 
sound and door is closed. However, assume next that none of the witnesses heard a 
bang just after the sound of the toy and assume also that normally, when the wind 
blows a door shut, there is a loud bang. With this information, two things can be done. 
First, the causal theory can be further expanded with the rule wind closes door ⇒c 
loud bang. Next, an argument can be built that defeats loud bang by first inferring 
none of the witnesses heard a loud bang from the testimonies, and then inferring there 
was no loud bang from this. Figure 7 shows the updated causal network together with 
the extra argument. Because of space limitations, only part of the updated causal theory 






























































Figure 7: the causal theory after King's explanation is added 
 
Hypothesis H1 still explains all the observations; King’s hypothesis, H2, only 
contains the proposition wind opens door. H2 also explains the facts that the toy made a 
sound and that the door was closed; however, it does not explain that King was in the 
backyard. If King wants to explain this fact, he either has to accept that he had bad 
intentions or must give an alternative explanation.  
Another problem with H2 is that it explains loud bang, while there is an undefeated 
evidential argument for the opposite. So applying Pennington and Hastie’s covering 
and consistency conditions, it can be argued that the prosecution’s explanation covers 
more (more observations are explained by H1 than by H2, and H1 is more consistent 
(because it does not explain propositions that are defeated).  
5. Conclusions and future research 
In conclusion, we have made the following contributions. First we have argued for 
a combination of a causal-abductive and a default-style argumentation modelling of 
evidential reasoning, thus avoiding a problem with reasoning about witness testimonies 
in a purely causal-abductive approach. In result, we have seen that there are two 
different kinds of links that have to be supported by safe generalisations: the causal 
links that are part of the story itself and the evidential links that are part of the 
arguments that connect the evidence to the story. Also, we have shown that there are 
two ways of analysing generalisations: if the generalisation itself is dubious, then it can 
be refined while if the generalisation is safe but in the case at hand a possible exception 
applies, then it can be attacked. Thus we have refined the ANT notion of anchoring in 
two important ways.  
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However, our approach still leaves some questions unanswered. Firstly, the exact 
details of how a hypothesis explains a set of observations and how hypotheses should 
be compared have not been discussed. For example, in this paper we have assumed that 
all observations are equally important but there may be different categories of 
observations, namely some that have to be explained by the hypothesis and some that 
add to the explaining hypothesis’ believability but do not necessarily have to be 
explained. Another important question is: when can one hypothesis be considered 
better than another? For example, is coverage more important than consistency?  
Secondly, the ideas proposed in this paper are just a start in the precise analysis of 
the role of stories in legal reasoning. For example, the exact role of templates like the 
one proposed by Pennington and Hastie for assessing the quality of a story as a whole 
is still unclear. 
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